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SECURITIES-LIABILITY FOR SHORT-SWING
PROFITS UNDER SECTION 16(b)
Since 1934' a controversy has raged among commentators' and
the judicial circuits3 over whether the initial purchase by which
one becomes the owner of 10 percent of a corporation's stock trig-
gers the six-month period during which any profits realized from
a subsequent sale are subject to forfeiture. This question has fi-
nally been answered in the negative by the United States Supreme
Court in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.4
The issue arose in the context of a corporate liquidation effec-
tuated by a sale of corporate assets in exchange for debentures of
the purchasing corporation. Provident Securities Company was a
"family" corporation, wholly owned by the descendents of its foun-
ders. In 1968, a decision was made to liquidate Provident's assets
and dissolve the corporation.5 Provident reached an agreement
with Foremost-McKesson, Inc. whereby Foremost would buy two-
thirds of Provident's assets, partly for cash and partly for $49.75
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.' The
I Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), was
the first case to consider this element of liability under section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. However, Seligman, in an article published shortly after
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, initially identified this aspect
of section 16(b) as a problem area. Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Ex-
change Act, 21 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1934).
2 See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 (2d ed. 1961); Munter,
Section 16(b) of the Securities exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning
Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats, " 52 CORNELL L. Rav. 69 (1966); Seligman,
supra note 1. Note, Ten Percent Stock Ownership-Prerequisite to Section 16(b)
Short-Swing Liability, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 838 (1975); Note, Is The Pur-
chase By Which One Becomes a Ten Percent Beneficial Owner a Statutory Pur-
chase Within the Meaning of Section 16(b)?, 7 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 104 (1975);
Comment, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten Percent Rule, 9 STAN. L. Rsv. 582
(1957).
The courts of appeals which have dealt with this issue are those of the Sec-
ond, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf W.
Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1142 (1976);
Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974); Emer-
son Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970); Newmark v. RKO
General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
96 S. Ct. 508, 512 (1976).
Id.
'Id.
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agreement further provided that Foremost would register $25 mil-
lion of these debentures under the Securities Act of 1933 and
would participate in an underwriting agreement by which the de-
bentures would be sold by Provident to the underwriters and
through them to the public.' The sale to Provident was made, and
since the debentures were immediately convertible into more than
10 percent of Foremost's outstanding common stock,' Provident
became a 10 percent beneficial owner of a class of equity securities
within the meaning of section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934."' One week later, pursuant to the agreement, Provident
sold debentures in the principal amount of $25 million to the un-
derwriters, receiving cash in the amount of $25,366,666.66.11 Hav-
ing acquired and disposed of these securities within six months,
Provident became concerned that it might be liable to Foremost
for the profits realized on the sale of the debentures. 2 Provident
therefore brought an action seeking a declaration of nonliability
under section 16(b) of the Act while Foremost counterclaimed for
a declaration of liability and recovery of the profit of $366,666.66.11
The District Court found in favor of Provident, but on grounds
other than the initial purchase question. 4 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 5 basing its conclusion on the fact that
Provident was not a 10 percent owner prior to its purchase of the
debentures. The Court found that by virtue of the exemptive prov-
iso which specifies that section 16(b) shall not be construed to
cover any transaction where the beneficial owner was not such
"both at the time of the purchase and sale," Provident was not a
statutory insider and thus not liable to Foremost for its profit upon
the sale of the securities within six months." The United States
15 U.S.C. § 77e-g (1970).
96 S. Ct. at 512.
Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). The owner of debentures convertible into more
than 10 percent of an equity security is deemed a beneficial owner within the
meaning of the Act. Id. § 78c(a)(10), (11). Rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a.2(b)
(1975). See note 23 infra.
" Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
"2 96 S. Ct. at 513.
13 Id.
" 331 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
" Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 614.
[Vol. 79
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Supreme Court, in a decision heavily dependent upon legislative
history, unanimously affirmed the holding of the Ninth Circuit.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193417 was
enacted to deter corporate insiders from engaging in short-swing
speculative trading in the securities of their own corporations.'8 Its
purpose was to engender investor confidence in a free and open
securities market and to discourage what was believed to be a
widespread abuse of the fiduciary relationship of corporate insi-
ders. 9 In order to effectively combat these abuses, section 16(b)
was designed to remove any possibility of profit from short-swing
insider transactions occurring within a six-month period."0 Thus,
section 16(b) provides for a recovery by or on behalf of the issuing
'1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This section provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be re-
coverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be con-
strued to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commis-
sion by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.
,R 2 L. Loss, SECunrri s REGULATION 1041 (2d ed. 1961).
s' Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959). The investigation which
preceded the adoption of the Act uncovered numerous instances in which corporate
insiders with access to advance information regarding changes in corporate finan-
cial policy, such as an increase or passing of dividends, were able to reap large
profits at the expense of the stockholders with whom they dealt. In fact, profits from
"sure thing" speculation were generally accepted by the financial community as
one of the usual emoluments of office. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAiiv. L. REv. 385, 386 (1953).
20 Id. at 407.
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corporation of any "profit realized"'" by any corporate "insider"2
on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the issuer's equity
stock 3 where both the opening and closing transactions occur
within six months of each other. Insiders are deemed liable under
the Act simply upon the showing of a purchase and sale within the
six-month period. Section 16(b) imposes a conclusive presumption
that an insider, under these circumstances, had access to inside
information. Therefore, proof of lack of intent to speculate or lack
21 The test which the courts have unanimously chosen to apply for computation
of "profit realized" is the "lowest price in-highest price out" method, first enunci-
ated in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). Under this rule the profits are calculated as follows:
Listed in one column are all the purchases made during the period for
which recovery of profits is sought. In another column is listed all of the
sales during that period. Then the shares purchased at the lowest price
are matched against an equal number of the shares sold at the highest
price within six months of such purchase, and the profit computed. After
that the next lowest price is matched against the next highest price and
that profit is computed. Then, the same process is repeated until all the
shares in the purchase column which may be matched against shares sold
for higher prices in the sales column have been matched off. The gross
recovery is the sum of profits thus determined.
Rubin and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Informa-
tion by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 482-83 (1947). Under this test, an insider
who has engaged in multiple transactions within a six month period could be liable
for "profits" under section 16(b) even though he has sustained a net loss in his
speculative transactions. For example, assume that an insider has made the follow-
ing transactions within a six month period:
TRANSACTION NUMBER OF SHARES PRICE
Purchase 100 $70
Sale 100 $60
Purchase 100 $50
Sale 100 $40
The insider in this example has sustained a net loss of $2,000, but by matching the
shares purchased at the lowest price ($50) with an equal number of shares sold at
the highest price ($60) he becomes liable for $1,000 "profit" under section 16(b).
2 For purposes of section 16(b), "insider" means directors, officers and benefi-
cial owners of more than 10 percent of any class of equity security. See 15 U.S.C. §
78p(a) (1970).
21 The type of security covered by the Act is "any equity security (other than
an exempted security) which is registered" pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(1). The term "equity security" has been broadly construed to include stock,
warrants and convertible securities. See note 10 supra.
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of inside information are unavailing as a defense.24 However, the
statute does make a distinction between individuals who are
deemed insiders because of their status as officers or directors, and
those who are deemed insiders because they are 10 percent benefi-
cial owners. This distinction is created by an exemptive proviso in
section 16(b) which states that:
[tihis subsection shall not be construed to cover any transac-
tion where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the secu-
rity involved. . ..
Therefore, the beneficial owner must be such at "both ends" of the
transaction, whereas there is no similar requirement for officers
and directors. In other words, if a director or officer were such
either at the time of the purchase or sale, then liability attaches
under section 16(b),28 but if a 10 percent owner is not such "both
at the time of the purchase and sale," then liability does not attach
under 16(b).2 Although the phrase "at the time of' seems unambi-
guous and easily comprehensible, the proper interpretation has
proved troublesome.
21 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). That strict liability was contemplated under the Act is made apparent
by the remarks of Representative Thomas Corcoran, chief spokesman for the
draftsmen of the Act, in Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency
on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 6557
(1934):
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell
the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impos-
sible to prove the exstence of such intention or expectation, and you have
to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the
burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he
bought, to get out on a short swing.
136 F.2d at 235-36.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added). See note 17 supra.
z' Since there is no similar exemptive proviso applicable to officers and direc-
tors, the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius should compel the conclu-
sion that one need only be an officer or director at either the time of purchase or
the time of sale. See Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974) (an individual who acquired stock, was simultaneously made a
director, and sold his stock within six months was liable for the profits); Feder v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970) (where an individual resigns his directorship after the purchase but prior to
the sale, he is a statutory insider); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(where an individual becomes a director after the purchase but prior to the sale,
he also is a statutory insider).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
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From the language of the statute it is clear that one who pur-
chases additional stock while contemporaneously owning more
than 10 percent, and who sells the stock so purchased, is liable to
the issuer for any profits obtained. This individual would be a 10
percent owner prior to the purchase, during the period between the
purchase and the sale, and after the sale. The more difficult situa-
tion occurs when an individual owning less than 10 percent pur-
chases an amount sufficient to carry him over the 10 percent
threshold, and then sells all or a portion of his holdings within six
months. Was he a 10 percent owner "at the time of the purchase?"
The answer to this question depends upon whether "at the time
of the purchase" means "prior to the purchase" or "immediately
following the purchase."
This exact issue was first raised and exhaustively discussed in
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp." That case involved a pur-
chase which brought the owner of 61/4 percent of the issuer's stock
to the status of beneficial owner of 21 percent of the shares. The
purchaser argued that the phrase "at the time of' should be con-
strued to mean "prior to" the purchase and sale, and that since it
owned less than 10 percent prior to the purchase, the transaction
which brought it over the 10 percent line did not make it a statu-
tory insider for section 16(b) purposes." The court rejected this
argument, stating that since the purpose of the statute was "to
protect the outside stockholders against at least short-wing specu-
lation by insiders with advance information," the statute should
be interpreted broadly.3 ' Judge Kaufman, while agreeing that
there was ambiguity in the exemption proviso, stated that the four
crucial words "at the time of" must be construed to mean "simul-
taneously with" rather than "prior to" the purchase and sale.32
Judge Kaufman believed that only this construction would be
consistent with the declared purpose of the statute to prevent the
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed the term "simultane-
ously with the purchase." This construction is equivalent to the Supreme Court
language of "immediately following the purchase." For purposes of conceptual
simplification the former construction will be used throughout this comment.
104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The question was initially raised on a
motion for summary judgment. The decision was reaffirmed after a trial on the
merits in the same court. 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part, remanded
in part on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
0 104 F. Supp. at 959.
Id., citing Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949).
12 Id. at 960.
[Vol. 79
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unfair use of inside information by officers, directors or owners of
more than 10 percent of the equity stock.3 3 The court reasoned that
if the "prior to" construction were adopted, a loophole would result
whereby it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block
of stock on his initial purchase, sell it out until his ownership was
reduced to less than 10 percent, and then repeat the process, ad
infinitum.3' The individual would not incur any liability under
section 16(b). This would be an unavoidable result of the adoption
of the "prior to" construction, since this shareholder would never
own more than 10 percent "prior to" any purchase, yet could have
nearly constant access to inside information. Judge Kaufman be-
lieved that the exemptive proviso was intended only to apply to the
situation where a 10 percent owner attempted to reduce his hold-
ings in stages.u Thus, where a 10 percent owner first reduced his
holdings to just below 10 percent, and then sold the remainder of
his shares in a subsequent transaction, he would be liable only for
profits obtained from the first sale, since he was not a 10 percent
owner at the time of the second sale.36 The court of appeals af-
firmed these portions by Judge Kaufman's decision, agreeing that
the potential loophole noted by the court would provide a mecha-
nism by which principal stockholders could evade section 16(b)
liability on short-swing transactions, thus rendering the statute
largely ineffective to remedy the perceived evil.3 7 However, Judge
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
3, 104 F. Supp. at 959.
3 Id. at 960.
11 See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970),
aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
11 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). The
commentators have generally approved of Judge Kaufman's position in Stella.
Professor Loss has stated that "it is difficult to quarrel with the court's preference
for the construction which would serve to effectuate the legislative purpose. . ....
2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060 (2d ed. 1961). Likewise, Messrs. Cook and
Feldman (then SEC Chairman and Special Counsel, respectively), in a leading
article written just after the Stella decision, approved Judge Kaufman's construc-
tion of the phrase "at the time of," citing with approval Judge Kaufman's state-
ment that:
[t]o construe it to exempt a transaction unless ten percent were held
both before and after would destroy the effectiveness of the section, since
a person could with impunity "purchase a large block of stock, sell it out
until his ownership was reduced to less than ten percent, and then repeat
the process, ad infinitum," even though he was an insider, with access
to inside information, throughout the period from the purchase to the
final sale.
7
Collins: Securities--Liability for Short-Swing Profits under Section 16(b)
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Hincks, in a strong dissent, asserted that there was no real ambigu-
ity in the exemptive proviso, and that it clearly meant to exempt
stockholders who did not own more than 10 percent "prior to" the
initial purchase." Judge Hincks argued that this was the only pos-
sible construction consonant with the purposes of the Act since the
basic rationale of the Act was such that only completed swing
transactions gave rise to the presumption that the insider had
access to inside information.39 In other words, both the purchase
and the sale must have been made by a person with access to inside
information. Since the defendant in Stella was not a statutory
insider at the time it decided to make the initial purchase, one
could not presume that the decision to effect the whole transac-
tion, that is, the purchase and the sale, could have been made on
the basis of inside information."
Both of these arguments are persuasive; there are two reason-
able interpretations of the words "at the time of" as used in this
proviso. Presuming that the statute is susceptible to differing in-
terpretations, the task then becomes one of discerning the true
legislative intent and applying that interpretation which best ef-
fectuates the legislative purpose. If section 16(b) was intended to
reach all possible situations in which an insider could use his posi-
tion to reap profits from short-swing speculative transactions, then
Judge Kaufman's "simultaneously with" construction would be
applicable. But if Judge Hincks is. correct in asserting that the
scope of section 16(b) is narrow, and that it is only meant to apply
to the situation where an individual makes his decision to engage
Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAnv. L.
Rav. 612, 631-32 (1953), quoting Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp.
at 959. The SEC took a similar position, filing an amicus brief in the District Court
advocating the "simultaneously with" construction and concluding "that the Con-
gress intended to include such purchases [i.e., those by which one becomes a 10
percent shareholder] within the scope of the Act." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae,
p. 5, Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
Finally, the American Law Institute in its proposed Federal Securities Code would
adopt the "simultaneously with" construction favored by Judge Kaufman in the
Stella decision by imposing civil liability with respect to "a purchase that makes a
person a more than 10 percent owner ... and a sale within less than six months
after the purchase that created that status, whether or not the seller has that status
at the time of the sale." ALI Fed. Sec. Code pt. XIV, § 1413(d) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973) (emphasis added).
232 F.2d 299, 303-4 (Hincks, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 305.
40 Id.
[Vol. 79
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss1/10
STUDENT NOTES
in both a purchase and a sale on the basis of inside information,
then a construction exempting a purchaser who could not be pre-
sumed to have made his initial purchase decision on the basis of
inside information is the more correct one.
Judge Kaufman's "simultaneously with" construction has
been adopted by a majority of courts which have faced the ques-
tion. In Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.,"1 the court cited an addi-
tional justification for retention of the "simultaneously with" con-
struction. The court reasoned that while the presumption that a
10 percent owner has access to inside information "would not jus-
tify the conclusion that one who purchases a quantity of shares
which makes him a ten percent beneficial owner has done so on the
basis of inside information, the presumed access to such informa-
tion resulting from this purchase provides him with an opportunity
not available to the investing public, to sell his shares at the mo-
ment most advantageous to him."42 The Stella interpretation has
also been explicitly adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Emerson
Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.," in which the court held that
this construction was consistent with Congress' purpose in enact-
ing the statute, thus overruling sub silentio the only court (prior
to the Provident court) to reach a contrary conclusion." When
Reliance Electric finally reached the United States Supreme
Court, the initial purchase question was no longer relevant to the
disposition of the case. However, the Court did appear to exhibit
some hostility toward the broad construction implicit in the Stella
approach by its adoption of a non-expansive, subjective construc-
tion of section 16(b), holding that the purchaser was not liable for
profits derived from the second sale in a two-stage divestment,
since it had sold down to 9.96 percent on the first sale. 5
" 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
Iz d. at 356 (emphasis added).
The Stella interpretation was reaffirmed in the most recent Second Circuit
decision of Perine v. William Norton & Co. Inc., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974). But
see Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1142 (1976) in which the Seventh Circuit has aligned itself
with the Provident decision of the Ninth Circuit.
43 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
" Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stevens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841
(W.D. Ark. 1956). The court merely adopted Judge Hincks' dissenting opinion
without analysis.
u1 Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
9
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In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.," the
Court's preference for a subjective application of section 16(b) be-
came clear. The majority held that the key element in defining the
terms "purchase" and "sale" was whether there was any possibil-
ity of speculative abuse.47 While the Supreme Court did not have
occasion to overrule the Stella decision until Provident, the clear
implication from Reliance Electric and Kern County was that the
Court would not favor imposition of the harsh results which strict
application of the "simultaneously with" construction could bring.
Despite some movement away from the "objective" approach
of the Stella rationale, the courts and a majority of commentators"
have, in the past, favored the "simultaneously with" construction
when applied to the initial transaction which made a person a 10
percent owner. When Provident broke step with this line of cases,
the district court did not directly address the question of whether
a purchase creating 10 percent ownership would always be a sec-
tion 16(b) transaction or, alternatively, would never be a section
16(b) transaction. The court simply adopted the Kern County
subjective approach of applying the statute only to those situations
subject to speculative manipulation.4 9 The court found that this
transaction did not lend itself to the type of speculative abuse
which section 16(b) was designed to prevent." However, the court
of appeals rejected the district court's conclusion that there was
not a potential for speculative abuse in this transaction.' Admit-
ting that Provident had access to inside information from the time
of the purchase until the time of the sale to the underwriters, the
court grounded its decision primarily upon a finding that the legis-
lative history surrounding the enactment of section 16(b) would
not support an interpretation which imposed liability on a person
411 U.S. 582 (1973).
Id. at 594. The Court expressed the fear that if a subjective approach were
not adopted, broad definitions of "purchase" and "sale" may "at least arguably,
reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale or purchase."
11 For commentators who have disagreed with the Stella approach see Painter,
Federal Regulation of Insider Trading (1968); Munter, note 2,supra; Cole, Insiders'
Liabilities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12Sw. L.J. 147 (1958); Note,
Short-Swing Profits and the Ten Percent Rule, 9 STAN. L. Rxv. 582 (1957); Com-
ment, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the
Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REv. 592 (1974).
11 331 F. Supp. at 792.
so Id.
11 506 F.2d at 605.
[Vol. 79
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who was not a 10 percent owner prior to the initial purchase.2 The
court then dealt with the Stella argument that adoption of the
"prior to" construction would necessarily preclude liability in the
case of a repurchase of a large block of shares subsequent to a sell-
down to below 10 percent. The court rather inelegantly closed this
loophole by simply limiting the "prior to" construction to the ini-
tial purchase transaction. The court acknowledged that this con-
struction mandates that the phrase "at the time of" would mean
"prior to" in the case of an opening transaction and "simultane-
ously with" in the case of a closing transaction, but concluded that
this "inconsistency" is not inconsistent with the rationale of the
section.-3
When Provident reached the Supreme Court, the analysis of
the court of appeals was enthusiastically embraced. The Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the "prior to" construc-
tion with respect to a purchase-sale sequence but refused to ex-
press an opinion on the lower court's application of a "simultane-
ously with" construction in a sale-repurchase situation. " In its
opinion, the Court paid particular attention to the legislative his-
tory surrounding the enactment of section 16(b). While admitting
2 Since a person who decides to purchase enough stock to increase
his holdings to 10 percent of a corporation's outstanding shares is an
outsider at the time he makes his investment decision, he does not fall
within the class of persons to which the conclusive presumption [i.e., the
presumption that he had access to inside information] was intended to
apply. He may have made that decision on the basis of inside informa-
tion, but such inside information could not have been acquired, in the
language of the statute, "by reason of his relationship to the issuer," or
in the language of the Supreme Court, [in Kern County] "from substan-
tial stockholdings that did not yet exist."
Id. at 614.
3 Id. The court attempted to justify this interpretation by citing dictum from
Reliance Electric to the effect that:
Where alternative construction of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional
purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders. 404
U.S. at 424.
The logic of this argument is difficult to grasp. Certainly this dictum does not
support a conclusion that a phrase may have two entirely different meanings when
applied to different words of a single sentence.
51 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976). Justice Powell delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court. Justice Stevens did not take part in the decision.
0 Id. at 515 n.15. See Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527
F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1142 (1976).
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that there was no definite expression of congressional intent with
regard to this question, the Court went on to examine the original
version of what was eventually to become section 16(b). The Court
found that the wording of an early draft of section 16(b) would
have applied liability only where a 10 percent owner had that
status before a purchase-sale was initiated, thus mandating a find-
ing of nonliability on the part of a defendant in Provident's posi-
tion." However, the version that was eventually enacted did not
contain the requirement that a beneficial owner must "own as of
record" the threshold amount, but it did add the troublesome
exemptive proviso. 51 The Court then reasoned that since the legis-
lative history afforded no explanation of the reason for the elimina-
tion of the prior ownership requirement in the bill as enacted, it
could not be presumed that Congress really meant to eliminate
this requirement." It is at best questionable whether the elimina-
11 Id. at 517. The original draft of what was to become section 16(b) was S.
2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). This original draft would have extended liability
to 5 percent beneficial owners, but the threshold amount was subsequently in-
creased to 10 percent. Hearings on S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 7741 (1934). The
draft clearly would not have imposed liability on a purchaser who did not own the
threshold amount prior to the purchase-sale sequence by providing in section 15(b)
that
lilt shall be unlawful for any director, officer or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any
class of stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a na-
tional securities exhange-
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention or
expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any profit
made by such person on any transaction in such a registered security
extending over a period of less than six months shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding the security pur-
chased for a period exceeding six months.
96 S. Ct. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
Id. at 517.
"' Id. at 518. The court of appeals also implied that the eliminated language
should be read into the bill as enacted on the ground that if Congress had really
meant to change the meaning of the draft they would have discussed the change.
The Supreme Court embraced the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit that, on the
basis of hearings held in connection with S. 2693, section 16(b) was
originally designed to deter insiders from purchasing stock without any
intention of making a long-term investment, but only with the intention
of profiting from upward fluctuations in the market price that were pre-
dictable on the basis of inside information. The section was directed
against an insider who has no intention of changing his investment rela-
[Vol. 79
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tion of important language from a legislative draft, without com-
ment, supports the conclusion that it was meant to be incorporated
into the final bill. But the Court went further, concluding that
even in the absence of clear expressions of legislative intent it
would be inappropriate to impose liability upon Provident on the
basis of such unclear language, and that if Congress wished to
impose such liability it should "do so expressly or by unmistakable
inference." 9 The Court acknowledged that under this holding, one
who purchases a more than 10 percent interest may sell on the
basis of information obtained by virtue of his newly acquired hold-
ings, without incurring liability under section 16(b). 0 But the
Court felt that other provisions of the securities laws such as sec-
tion 10(b) 6 and rule 10b-511 provided adequate recourse to an
investor who could show harm from the actual misuse of inside
information. 3
Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that adoption of
tionship to the corporation, but rather has an 'intention or expectation'
to purchase and sell the stock within six months. After the pair of trans-
actions is completed he intends to own exactly the same interests in the
corporation as he owned before he began his speculative venture.
506 F.2d at 609.
' Id. at 520.
Id. at 520-21. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
6115 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
1Z 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 9tatements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
96 S. Ct. at 521.
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the "prior to" construction rendered sections 16(d) and 16(e)" of
the Securities Exchange Act, as well as rule 16b-2,65 superfluous.
It was properly held that these provisions would still be necessary
to protect underwriters and dealers already qualifyng as ten per-
cent owners when they purchased. 6
The Provident case presents a close question, but in many
ways the decision is an unfortunate one. It is probably true that
the drafters of section 16(b) were primarily concerned with stop-
ping double-transaction abuse, but this fact does not inevitably
lead to the conclusion that they meant to ignore the problem of
single-transaction insider speculation. Under this holding, one
may initially purchase up to 100 percent of a corporation's stock
and sell the same within six months on the basis of inside informa-
tion without incurring any liability under section 16(b).
The Provident decision ignores the fact that a person who
acquires a large block of stock in a single transaction normally does
have access to inside information before he makes the purchase.
Since he would necessarily deal in negotiations leading up to the
purchase with either the issuer or an insider holding a large inter-
est, he would be in a position to bargain for disclosures not avail-
able to the public."1 Thus, prior to its purchase of the debentures,
Provident could have acquired inside information by reason of its
relationship to the issuer. The fact that section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5 may provide an alternative remedy in cases such as this is an
illusory comfort. Rule 10b-5 requires proof of actual misuse of in-
side information as well as injury to the plaintiff," whereas section
16(b) is self-operative, requiring only a showing of a purchase and
sale within six months by an insider. The mere possibility of abuse
of inside information will not sustain a rule 10b-5 action since
insider status does not create a presumption of access to informa-
tion as it does under section 16(b). It is clear that a plaintiff's
burden would be much greater in trying to recover short-swing
profits under rule 10b-5 than under section 10(b). Indeed, the bur-
den of'proving intent or actual use of inside information would be
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(d), (e) (1970).
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1975).
' 96 S. Ct. at 523.
' Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors
Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied sub norn. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
[Vol. 79
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virtually insurmountable by most plaintiffs under these circum-
stances. 9
In Reliance Electric, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"the legislative history affords no explanation of the purpose of the
proviso. '70 However, with that same legislative history before
them, the Court has now chosen to seize upon a fragment of that
history-one of several early drafts of section 16(b) which never
became law-and from this fragment adopt a construction of sec-
tion 16(b) which flatly contradicts the express purpose of the stat-
ute which is to prevent "the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner."
7
'
The fact that Congress has taken no action to reverse the
Stella construction of section 16(b) during the 20 year period since
that decision, strongly militates against a conclusion that this
long-standing construction was contrary to congressional intent.
As the Supreme Court stated in Flood v. Kuhn,72 "[i]f there is any
inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not
by this Court." 73 Neither the statutory language nor the sparse
legislative history provides a definitive answer to the problem. In
the final analysis, public policy should control the question, and
that policy clearly would be furthered by a more liberal interpreta-
tion of section 16(b).
Vincent A. Collins
11 136 F.2d at 235.
10 404 U.S. at 424 (1972).
", 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
72 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
11 Id. at 284.
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